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C3DJABCM
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     AMERICAN BROADCASTING
     COMPANIES, INC., et al.,
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                    Plaintiffs,
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                                            12 Civ. 1540 AJN
               V.
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     AEREO, INC.,
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                    Defendant.
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                                             March 13, 2012
                                             3:43 p.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. ALISON J. NATHAN,
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                                             District Judge
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(In open court)

(Case called)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

As you say, there is a parallel matter with a motion to consolidate pending in front of Judge Marrero. He has not acted on that yet. I have attempted to contact him today and was unable to reach him. He has got some family matters to attend to, but I will see what he wants to do with that.

I don't know how that impacts what we need to do today, which I gather is to set a schedule, but why don't I hear from you, Mr. Keller. To tell you what I have before me, I reviewed the complaint, and then I have a letter from -- am I saying it right, AEREO?

And then I have an answer as of today which I have briefly seen and a letter indicating AEREO's views as to an appropriate schedule, seeking to move to final disposition.

But, Mr. Keller, I don't believe I have your views on specific process going forward. So why don't you start situating me any way that you like and then turning to the process.

MR. KELLER: Maybe because you raised the scheduling issue first, I'll address that although if I can get a couple of seconds to talk to you about our view of the matters, I would like to do that, too, not too much because we are early in the case. We need a preliminary injunction. Our position is there is irreparable harm that will ensue as of tomorrow

when AEREO publicly launches its service, which as I think you know, will capture over-the-air television signals as they are broadcast, process them and then transmit them or retransmit those broadcasts over the internet to AEREO subscribers.

THE COURT: Just to be clear, you face irreparable harm tomorrow, but you have not filed a motion for preliminary injunction?

MR. KELLER: We have yet to file a motion for preliminary injunction. The only reason you don't have that in front of you, I picked up the phone and contacted Chambers to see what the court would like to do by way of a schedule. I read your rules. I know know how you like to hold preliminary injunction hearings.

Rather than unilaterally move for something, I thought it would be good to contact Chambers, come down and talk to you about what we think a sensible schedule is, taking into account the court's own schedule. We are prepared to move, but we think -- and I don't think there is any disagreement on this piece of what --

THE COURT: Just so we have clarity on the record, when did you contact Chambers?

MR. KELLER: We called Chambers last Friday, your Honor.

THE COURT: Last Friday, which was March 9th you contacted Chambers? So five days before irreparable harm?

MR. KELLER: Five days before the launch for sure and upon the launch, we think we are really going to be facing irreparable harm that would be a prerequisite to you issuing the relief we seek. The reason we don't think anything of significance has happened before then is all the cases that say if a defendant or potential defendant says they're test marketing something, things aren't really imminent.

When they publicly announced this defendant announced it was going to actually launch its service, that's when things really become imminent. They announced they were going to publicly launch in the middle of February, and our complaint was on file I think 10 to 12 days thereafter.

It was a week after that that we contacted Chambers to say let's talk about this so we can proceed in the most expeditious manner. We think we have actually accomplished quite a bit because I don't think, as I was about to say, that there is any disagreement that some evidentiary record will be useful to you in coming up with your ruling on our preliminary injunction motion.

We think this is the type of case where facts matter, and there may be disputes about facts. There may not be disputes about facts. We don't know because we still don't know how it is that AEREO actually processes the television signals that it takes and streams across the internet. It could do so in a variety of ways.

They have been opaque about that until now. We think that a limited evidentiary record and expedited discovery on that so we can lay it out before you is the way to go. It will be the most useful, and I think everybody one agrees with that.

I received a copy of the letter that you received yesterday, and I understand their position to be we don't oppose expedited discovery as long as it is in connection with an expedited summary judgment hearing. They may have a grounds for moving for summary judgment, your Honor. I don't know. There may be disputed facts. There may not be.

I do know this: We're not willing to wait four months for a hearing that the court will first undertake to think about whether summary judgment should issue. We do suffer irreparable harm from what we claim to be a very obvious case of copyright infringement. It flows as a matter of course.

It is not the first time in this courthouse that a television internet streaming service has been found to cause irreparable harm by the virtue of the fact they're retransmitting without permission the signals.

THE COURT: What case?

MR. KELLER: Judge Buchwald's two cases. The IVI case, and I can provide you with a copy before we leave, and there is also the Film On case which issued a temporary restraining order.

In that case, to be fair, the legal defense was a

little different. In that case, the defendant said they qualify for one of the secondary transmissions, safe harbors, if you will, the compulsory licenses, of which there are several in the Copyright Act. There are limited circumstances under which a cable television company, for example, your Honor, can take signals out of the air, process them and stream them across cables to their subscribers, but that is a very narrow, heavily regulated statutory scheme and it is examined in great detail by Judge Buchwald. AEREO is not relying on that for good reason.

That defendant was enjoined preliminarily after a short period of expedited discovery. In this case, as you know from the answer and the counterclaim, and you know from the letter that they submitted, they're relying on the Cablevision case decided by the Second Circuit. They have not told you everything about the Cablevision case, your Honor. Cablevision does not cover what it is that they're doing and, in fact, the very argument that they are making as to why Cablevision helps them was rejected by Justice Kagan, then Solicitor General Kagan when she filed a brief in the Cablevision case when it was wending its way up for cert. in the Supreme Court.

She said it is a wrong interpretation of the Copyright

Act to say that mini-antennas, which they say result in a

one-to-one transmission, the mini-antenna, there is the

subscriber, they link the two. That does not take that out of

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the realm of a classic public performance and that is why we think Cablevision does not excuse their conduct and why we'll prevail on the merits.

It is early in the case and obviously because I am in it a little longer than you, I could go on and on. That is not quite fair. If I leave you for two thoughts today, it is to read a particular section of the Cablevision opinion, which I have a copy of, too, and --

THE COURT: I have it.

MR. KELLER: You'll know that on Page 134 in the Reporter of that decision, the court goes out of its way to distinguish between public performance analysis and a reproduction right analysis, and the preliminary injunction that we seek will be based on a violation of the public performance right.

Cablevision was very cable in the court's opinion, they said they're not the same, and the fact that, for the purposes of that reproduction right analysis which we are not moving on, the fact that a subscriber or an end user is found to make the copy does not answer the question of whether Cablevision and not the subscriber might be involved in the act of public performance.

THE COURT: For the purposes of that, which I understand to be somewhat narrow, what discovery do you need? If I understand what you've just said, the preliminary C3DJABCM Motions

injunction you intend to move on is for a violation of public performance right, direct infringement?

MR. KELLER: Correct.

THE COURT: No secondary infringement?

MR. KELLER: No.

THE COURT: What discovery do you need and what time-frame would you need for --

MR. KELLER: As to time-frame, I notice in the letter you got yesterday they said they're prepared to give us discovery very rapidly. Depending on how they define "very rapidly," and what they intend to give up easily, I would think we need a period of four weeks or so, maybe four to six, no more than that, to get all the information we need to have it vetted by the people that we might retain as experts so we can understand exactly how this thing ticks.

Once we know that, because --

THE COURT: You need that for the limited PI that you intend to move on for the violation of public performance right?

MR. KELLER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And four to six weeks for discovery, and then what are you thinking in terms of briefing and hearing?

MR. KELLER: I work backwards. It may be faster than four to six weeks and we should know if it were. We would like to have a preliminary injunction hearing before you no later

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than the week of May 14th. We would like to do it sooner than that if you could accommodate us and we get what we need in discovery.

THE COURT: Well, if I can accommodate it, working backwards, if that is what I can accommodate, then that's the time that there will be for discovery. If that is a workable time for a PI, then the time in advance of that will have to be make-work for discovery and briefing.

MR. KELLER: If we have a hearing the week of the 14th, that leaves us basically eight weeks from where we are now. If we have all of our, papers depending on the schedule that you set, in before you and the witness list and anything else you might require, the written testimony on direct comes in through declarations, if we have that all in the week before that --

THE COURT: That is eight weeks.

MR. KELLER: The hearing, the actual hearing will be the 8th week from now, that is what I am saying. If I am unclear about that, I apologize.

THE COURT: No, I thought that I had a moment of thinking you're in vigorous agreement. I'll hear from your opposing counsel.

MR. KELLER: Their schedule, they said 10 weeks for expedited discovery, but then briefing and then a hearing on the summary judgment, that is how they get to their generally

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Honor.

1 stated four months. We cannot wait that. 2 You want two months? THE COURT: 3 MR. KELLER: We want to have a hearing no later than eight weeks from now and we'd like to do it sooner. If we can 4 5 get to you sooner, we are bound and determined to do that. 6 THE COURT: Just to map it out, what you'd like, Mr. 7 Keller, is four to six weeks of discovery? MR. KELLER: At the out outside. 8 9 THE COURT: At the outside with a hearing, and how 10 much time, how much calendar time do you anticipate for a 11 hearing? MR. KELLER: You know, this is not -- given the way 12 13 that you take preliminary injunctions through written direct, 14 your Honor --15 THE COURT: Well, I'm open here. I'd like to hear 16 from both sides on this. It may be the more efficient thing 17 for making me smart on what I need to know here to do live direct. 18 19 MR. KELLER: Even so, I was going to say I can't 20 imagine this more than two days, I really don't think that. 21 THE COURT: Two days if I do live direct? 22 MR. KELLER: I think two days with live testimony and 23 I still think it is a two-day hearing at most, your cross.

THE COURT: And then what happens following the PI?

MR. KELLER: Here is where we are in disagreement. The suggestion has been made that somehow we're making more work for the court because then there is a summary judgment record that has to be prepared and you're doing it twice. That is not the way the rules work. Rule 56 and Rule 65 are not mutually exclusive and it is often the case that a preliminary injunction record, in fact, is virtually all of the summary judgment record.

We are not taking the position on whether they're going to have an undisputed record that allows for summary judgment or not. We don't know that yet. We haven't had the discovery. Maybe they're right and there isn't much, but I'm not sure about that.

What we do know is that the fact that a defendant wants summary judgment pretty quickly is not a defense or reason not to grant an early preliminary injunction hearing. We have a right to seek such a hearing. We have made the case that, based on cases from this courthouse, irreparable harm flows if, in fact, they are infringing not as a matter of presumption, as a matter of fact that we can prove, that is what Judge Buchwald ruled in her IVI, case and we are prepared to build that record in the next six to eight weeks.

They would like, obviously, to drag it out. I don't mean that pejoratively; I mean that factually. They're thinking about four months out. We can't wait that long.

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By the way, your Honor, the proposal that they made to you --

Can you just flesh out a little bit for me THE COURT: why you can't?

MR. KELLER: Because irreparable harm happens every day our rights are infringed, and they're going live, as we understand it, in the New York market tomorrow, and according to the press reports -- and we'll get discovery on this to find out if it is so -- New York is still itself just a test market. They plan to go nationally very quickly according to Mr. Diller, one of their investors, 75 to 100 markets, and we are not clear on the time-frame. We want to know about that, too.

New York is still a test market. We are not waiting any longer. They think they can go live. They say that they've been out there doing this for some time. Your Honor, it is what is known as a beta test. It is an experimental This is even more narrow. It was an invitation-only beta test. It wasn't widely available according to what they said about their own service. You had to be invited in some way to be part of the beta group.

It was the most preliminary of experiments. Now they think they can go live. We're here today to say you can't do it without causing us irreparable injury, and we want to enjoin it early, as early as we possibly can.

The summary judgment procedure that they've outlined

they've cited, that is what happened to Cablevision. They're
exactly right, that is what happened to Cablevision. What they
didn't tell you in their letter is that Cablevision agreed not

to launch its service while the courts had a chance to vet it

for whether it was copyright infringement or not.

The whole process that they've said is eminently reasonable might be eminently reasonable if they didn't launch tomorrow. But we have asked them would you not launch? That is the first thing we asked. Then we can come up with an agreed-upon schedule like Cablevision. They said we are not waiting, we are ready to go. That is why we need preliminary injunctive relief and we need it now.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Keller. Let me hear from Mr. Hosp.

MR. HOSP: Yes, your Honor, this is Mr. Englander.

MR. ENGLANDER: I am going to speak, your Honor, but Mr. Hosp may need to straighten me out from time to time.

As we indicated in our letter, your Honor, we're interested in resolving this as expeditiously and efficiently as we can. We are a small start-up. We have been accused of copyright infringement in connection with what we do. We need to have that resolved.

We think the preliminary injunction process being proposed to you will actually delay things and get in the way of that and that is why we have indicated an objection. It is

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possible we can work something out so that that is not the case.

THE COURT: Is it right that there is no possibility of an agreed-upon delay of launch to work out a schedule?

MR. ENGLANDER: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: I thought maybe if I asked, it would be different.

MR. ENGLANDER: No, your Honor. Maybe I should address this first.

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

MR. ENGLANDER: There are a number, as Mr. Keller Maybe I should address this first. They have delayed said. the opportunity to get this resolved on a reasonable schedule for at least nine months, your Honor. There is no reason that they could not have come to court and sought a declaratory judgment. We did everything but give blueprints, okay?

That is perhaps an exaggeration, but we have been very transparent.

THE COURT: I haven't looked at the IVI case, but can you respond to the point?

MR. ENGLANDER: It is a very, very different system and set of ideas and concepts. What we are doing is providing a system that a consumer can use to do nothing different than a consumer has every right to do right now. A consumer right now

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can get over-the-air broadcasting by having an antenna on the roof of their home. They can make a copy of that, unique copy for their own personal use and they can play it back to themselves.

All we are doing is remotely locating an antenna. They're very small antennas.

THE COURT: The size of a dime?

MR. ENGLANDER: Exactly. This is one of them and there will be thousands of them. The consumer will tune in to their own antenna. In other words, they will sit at home, go onto our system using our system, and think of it as a machine using our system, tune their antenna, make a copy, their own unique copy of that television program and then play that back, that unique copy that is theirs back to themselves.

Your Honor, two cases conclude that that is entirely One is the Cablevision decision from the Second Circuit, four years' old, that dealt with the remote storage DVR being offered by Cablevision, and I think other is Sony. Sony came from the U.S. Supreme Court which says that a consumer has the right to get over-the-air broadcasts, make a copy for their own personal use and play it back to themselves.

So that is what we have here. We have told the industry, and had specific meetings with many of Mr. Keller's clients in which over the last several months we have explained what we're doing. If they needed relief and they were really

concerned about it on a preliminary basis, they could have sought a declaratory judgment at any time. They did not. They waited until just before the launch, and now they tell you it is very urgent they get decided.

THE COURT: Isn't that an argument you could potentially make counter to their irreparable harm arguments? Why would that preclude them from bringing a preliminary injunction motion?

MR. ENGLANDER: The answer is it doesn't. The concern we have is simply somehow they seem to be suggesting to you that they're going to divide up discovery so that what we'll have is one process where they seek a preliminary injunction and then the case will still by out there not resolved and hanging over the head of this start-up company.

If we can manufacture a schedule so that we can also have in front of you the summary judgment motions that we believe are appropriate on a record that they do not claim is incomplete — the thing we don't want to have happen is we go through a process where they move for preliminary injunction, we move for summary judgment, and they say 56 (e), we are not ready yet to decide this.

They haven't given us all the facts. We are going to do discovery, get the complete discovery done that needs to be done so your Honor has in front of you the full facts. We think this case is a case, primarily a case that gets decided

on the law. We have to know how our system works. That is important.

There may be some other facts we need to do discovery of from them, but we can do that rapidly and then have before your Honor all you need to decide a motion for summary judgment, and if they choose to file a motion for preliminary injunction, a motion for preliminary injunction. We need to work on a schedule that allows us to come before you.

In the Cablevision case which we were involved in -THE COURT: And you think you can do that, that can be
done in, accomplished in four months, a hearing in four months?

MR. ENGLANDER: We hashed out a schedule in which it was basically briefing completed in four months. We may be able to do it faster with cooperation from the parties, I believe we could. I am listening to Mr. Keller saying he is going to have four to six weeks of discovery and a hearing in eight weeks, and I am wondering where the briefing comes in. We haven't even seen their motion yet.

Their schedule, it seems to me, I don't quite get it.

Are they saying they're going to file their motion before

discovery is complete or are we going to be, after 9 months are
they going to give us four days to respond to a preliminary
injunction motion?

We have, with respect to preliminary injunction motion, we have a serious issue about irreparable harm that

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needs discovery. What we are talking about here, because this is something the consumers can do now, it is not at all evident what the irreparable harm is. Tomorrow when we provide another system that does what consumers can do anyway, it is not clear what the irreparable harm is to the broadcasters from that. There should be none. So we need discovery on that, and that is part of the reason we thought this process needs to play a little long longer.

THE COURT: What would that look like? What amount of time would it take?

MR. ENGLANDER: We can do it within the time they're taking discovery on our system, we believe, your Honor simultaneously.

THE COURT: Not less?

MR. ENGLANDER: Less time than that? I think it is four to six weeks.

THE COURT: What would it look like?

MR. ENGLANDER: It would look like discovery of the people who, I suppose --

THE COURT: Are you talking depositions?

MR. ENGLANDER: I think so, yes, your Honor, because interrogatories as to what their contention is, how they claim that they are being irreparably harmed, followed by witnesses with respect to how they claim they're being irreparably harmed, and probably simultaneously documents from them

regarding their retransmission agreements that they currently have because we believe they're going to claim that they're losing revenue from — that they are potentially going to lose revenue from the retransmission agreements they have. We are going to need the retransmission agreements and we are going to need to take discovery about those.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOSP: I had one or two quick things to add.

One of it was on the urgency that is being argued here. The reality is there were a series of announcements, public announcements about this company that started close to a year ago. Mr. Canuge went out to the FCC, had numerous conversations with executives, with many plaintiffs before you were explaining the technology.

It was known that this was, the planned launch was for the first -- at some point early on in this year. The claim that somehow the world changed as of February 14th when the announcement was made that the roll-out would begin on March 14th -- and let me just be clear about that. The roll-out that begins tomorrow is not a black or white kind of a thing. It is not as though tomorrow hundreds and thousands of people can sign up. There is a process to this. There is a continuation of a roll-out that has already begun. There is no question the announcement talked about the roll-out because that is the way you do these things, roll things out, you have public

announcements. It is continuation of a process that began quite a while ago, and there was no material information that was disclosed on February 14th that the plaintiffs didn't have prior to that.

I also point out that the announcement was made on February 14th. The complaint wasn't filed until I believe the 1st. So, yes, March 1st, so a little over two weeks, they waited two weeks to file it. Then they waited another eight days to contact Chambers. So they have a already built in another month. And the notion that somehow we are talking some of the largest companies in America who had prior knowledge of this, who are building in this time — in fact, the notion that somehow it's the defendants who are trying to cause delay here is not the case. The reality is it is the defendants who are looking to get this resolved quickly.

One question I am not clear on is what discovery is done in the preliminary injunction phase that isn't done in the phase regarding summary judgment or disposition on the merits. I am not entirely clear what it is that can be cordoned off. The reality is they're going to ask for documents regarding our system. That is the majority of our documents. The reality is if we are talking about preliminary injunction, particularly preliminary injunction, we are going to be digging very deeply into the documents they have on irreparable harm. The delay came prior to the filing of the action.

C3DJABCM Motions It is not clear to me on either side whether it is on the plaintiff's side or the defendant's side, what the difference is behind the discovery. It is not clear to me. THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Keller on that. I thought I heard you say something like we can just take what we do for --MR. KELLER: That is exactly what I said. THE COURT: -- without additional discovery? MR. KELLER: That is exactly what I said. This notion there is a duality here in discovery is not one of my making. I said the opposite. THE COURT: Tell me again, I want to focus for a minute on why we can just do this. There is a time question. Let's just for a second bracket the time question. MR. KELLER: Put that aside. Here is my answer. They're entitled to move for summary judgment at any That is what Rule 56 says. They can move for it

tomorrow. They can move for it at the close of expedited discovery.

THE COURT: I suppose you have to answer first.

MR. KELLER: Actually, at any time.

THE COURT: They can move --

MR. KELLER: At any time, that is what the rule says. They put in their answer and counterclaim. If they think we

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THE COURT: I understand you say they need some discovery?

MR. KELLER: Not trying to cut it off. I want them to take that discovery. We are going to have some issues, however, for the same reason that Judge Buchwald denied the type of discovery that they now say they want, the very type of discovery they want. The details of those agreements were not important to irreparable harm. There was motion practice before Judge Buchwald. She says you're not entitled to that stuff and I'm not going to give it to you.

She turned to the plaintiffs in IVI and said, of course, if you can't prove your irreparable harm harm case because there wasn't adequate discovery, don't come crying to me. We'll take that ruling. We are fine with that. There is no duality, no extra work. They can make their motion at any time. It is always the case, always is an overstatement, preliminary injunction records and summary judgment records are very similar.

THE COURT: It is true it is often the case that PI and preliminary in injunction get consolidated.

MR. KELLER: You have that right under Rule 65 if you want to convert this to a trial on the merits, Judge, if you give the parties notice, you have the right to do that. Nobody here is urging you to do that, but you certainly could do that, and it is for that very reason courts have the right to do that

on notice because the records don't always differ that much.

We're not opposed to that. What we are opposed to is this notion of four weeks out. I need to respond to two other things.

THE COURT: Yes. I think one of them will be if it is four to six weeks for discovery, what are you looking at for --

MR. KELLER: Our preliminary injunction brief. It is not uncommon in this courthouse at all for expedited discovery to precede the briefing that the court gets as to why each side thinks an injunction should or should not issue.

Actually, we thought it was — that is why we called Chambers. By the way, the notion that we delayed, we would have been before you sooner if Mr. Hosp and I had been able to either reach agreement or agree that we couldn't agree. There was a little back—and—forth that got left out that led to the eight days that followed the final of the claim. It is immaterial. I'll get to the main event.

The main event is that we are ready to take the expedited discovery. I'll get on the phone with Mr. Hosp later or tomorrow morning and tell them what we need. They can tell us what they need. If there is no disagreement, we'll go to it. The notion, though, that somehow they can't respond because they haven't seen a brief yet is really the opposite. We came down here and said let's talk about this.

THE COURT: I missed that point.

MR. KELLER: There was suggestion somehow the brief has to come in before we move for preliminary injunctive relief.

THE COURT: I hadn't understood that. I thought the point was if it takes on the outside six weeks to do the discovery, and then there is a hearing two weeks later, are you talking about doing your motion and their opposition and their reply within those two weeks?

MR. KELLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Presumably with a little bit of time for me to read the papers?

MR. KELLER: Absolutely. The schedule, eight weeks out at the outside, but discovery can be shorter than the four to six weeks. That will allow the parties to fully -- look, Judge, in all honesty, they're ready. They made an appearance a half a day after we filed the complaint. They already put in their answer and counterclaim. They have already written to you on the subject. They have been ready for a long time.

We haven't been ready because I have to tell you discovery will show there were no blueprints suggested, there was no transparency. There was discussion about we're going to test market this service. You know what, we are going to retransmit your signals and we think we can do it under Cablevision. That is all we knew.

We knew one more thing. Their antennas are really,

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really small. That doesn't change anything. It is what goes on behind the scene that makes the difference. That is why we need expedited discovery. Once we get that discovery, we will be ready to brief it, and you'll have ample time to read our moving brief, their opposition, and any reply that we choose to put in. We may not need one. We may talk to you about it when we come see you.

The one thing I want to impress upon you in addition to the Cablevision case, obviously, and --

THE COURT: Before you turn to that, is there any front briefing you can do before?

MR. KELLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Just to see in your interpretation, but could you do a --

MR. KELLER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: So everybody knows what target here is?

MR. KELLER: We are happy to do it.

THE COURT: What would that look like?

MR. KELLER: It would be devoid of facts, but it would be a primer on the law to the extent that either side thinks that Cablevision is important for you to really dissect, each side can dissect it, we are all for that. We can have a brief in next week.

Theirs is probably halfway written, Judge. They have had on their web site their legal theory available for

everybody to see. What we haven't had are the facts and, of course, we haven't had the imminence of a launch.

There is not a single case that suggests that you have to sue for a preliminary injunction on the basis of a test market. You can look for it. They go the other way. You don't have to. That delay argument, as you said, goes to the merits whether or not a preliminary injunction should issue. It is not a reason not to schedule it.

The thing that I think is most telling of what you just heard, Mr. Englander must have used the word "copies" half a dozen or more times. We are not focused on the copy except insofar as a copy assists the public performance.

We are not talking about time-shifting. We go home, and you want to record a program and you want to watch it the next day? That is time-shifting. The Supreme Court has spoken. You, in the privacy of your own home, can do that. That is not what we are talking about in terms of preliminary injunction motion.

We are talking about the same transmission of television signals in real time enjoined in IVI case, I Crave TV case in 2000 in the Western District of Pennsylvania. This is not the first time somebody tried to use the internet as a retransmission medium. Every time they tried to do it with copyright and television programs, they have been enjoined.

The same results should obtain here. We can start

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briefing you why next week, but we need to get that hearing on so we can get that preliminary injunction, and we would like to do it, if the court would permit, no later than the week of May 14th.

THE COURT: I have a couple of questions.

I think I need, at some point we need to bring the Jenner folks in a little bit because it is not consolidated, but if it is consolidated, I am wondering now if we are on the same schedule or not. You've presented a very, what I understand as to be a quite narrow claim just on direct infringement, just going to the violation of public performance right.

> MR. KELLER: That's correct.

THE COURT: I don't know if that is where they are and how and if these matters are consolidated, how that affects the the schedule. Let me hear from everyone on that point and then we'll return to the cases actually in front of us.

> Thank your Honor. Steve Fabrizio. MR. FABRIZIO:

We agreed with everything Mr. Keller said in terms of need to quickly get the preliminary injunction and a need to avoid a four month schedule which everybody knows is not ultimately going to be four months for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Sorry, everybody knows what?

MR. FABRIZIO: It is not ultimately going to be the end date for preliminary injunction. That will be when the

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briefs go in. Then there will have to be a hearing and decision and there will probably be more argument about what form of injunction should issue. I don't suppose everyone concedes all of those issues after-the-fact.

We have every expectation and hope that we will very quickly be before you in this Court and that these two cases should proceed in absolute lockstep on the same schedule without double-teaming AEREO. We are in close coordination, we will coordinate discovery, coordinate hearings. Our expectation is that having the two cases together is not going to add any additional time.

THE COURT: Are your claims limited in the same way as Mr. Keller's?

MR. FABRIZIO: We have the exact same public performance claim, direct infringement. We also have an alternative unfair competition claim.

THE COURT: That is your state claim?

MR. FABRIZIO: Yes.

THE COURT: Before your state claim under the Copyright Act, I'll take a peek at your complaint.

MR. FABRIZIO: Ah --

THE COURT: I thought I saw some reference to contributory, secondary liability?

MR. FABRIZIO: We would be moving for preliminary injunction on direct infringement of the public performance

1 right and perhaps on the state law claim in the alternative.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. FABRIZIO: That is it. We believe the discovery that is needed for both of those is essentially the same when you consider irreparable harm.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. England.

MR. ENGLANDER: The first point is it is true we can file a motion for summary judgment at any time. As I indicated and I thought --

THE COURT: You indicated you need discovery?

MR. ENGLANDER: No, we don't need discovery to move for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Right. You said you needed discovery on irreparable harm?

MR. ENGLANDER: We are ready to move for summary judgment, but what we don't want is a schedule to come before you once on preliminary injunction and we file a motion, and he says 56 (e), I haven't had enough discovery yet.

We need a schedule that allows us to present both of them before you. If there is a belief that we can do that in eight weeks, I am very skeptical of that because I certainly don't think in a matter of this magnitude, when we haven't seen their motion for preliminary injunction yet, we should be forced into some extraordinarily rapid response brief.

Mr. Keller says we have our briefing ready. That is

not true with respect to irreparable harm. We do not know their irreparable harm case. We can certainly brief why it is that we think what we are doing is lawful. We are prepared to do that.

We don't have a motion for preliminary injunction or an irreparable harm motion or even, even an outline of what their irreparable harm case supposedly is. I am skeptical of eight weeks. Am I skeptical of 12? Probably not as long as we are going to put both types of motions before you at the same time so that we a have the opportunity to resolve the entire matter at the same time.

Your Honor may decide no, but we would like that opportunity, and not to go at this piecemeal because what that is, that is a prescription for AEREO not to have this matter resolved and have it continue on.

THE COURT: I understand that. Am I hearing you right that it a difference between two months and four months?

MR. KELLER: No, I don't think so that is right. Mr. Fabrizio put his finger right on it. Their proposal is quite different as it was articulated in the letter. Maybe it changed a little bit today.

It is 10 weeks or it was 10 weeks of discovery, then a briefing schedule, then we submit it your Honor, four months out we start briefing it, moving brief, opposition brief, reply brief. Then you get to decide it. Of course, I know the court

will do as fast as it can, but there is a difference between deciding summary judgment and having to rule quickly on a preliminary injunction record.

Then as he said, there will be some disagreement if we are to prevail over the scope of an injunction, and all of that means what they really want is something a few more months out, and we can't wait and it is not a defense. It is not the basis for opposing preliminary injunction to say I want summary judgment, and I am not representing, your Honor, one way or the other whether there will be additional discovery necessary. Right now I am hard-pressed to think about what it will be. In large part whether additional discovery is going to be needed will depend on how candid they are about what the facts really are.

We are going to face exactly the same issue, though, when we're in expedited discovery to build a preliminary injunction record. The more cooperation, the less need for discovery further down the road. This is not an attempt to get two bites at the apple. It is an attempt to do what we are entitled to do, which is ask the court for preliminary injunctive relief on an expedited schedule.

It was an excellent suggestion you made. We are happy to submit to the court, even bereft of detailed facts, why Cablevision cuts against them in several significant ways. We have Solicitor Kagan's brief on that, we can work it into our

brief and point out why. We have got the IVI case. We have the I Crave TV case. We have two or three other cases where efforts to use the internet to transmit copyrighted program was held to violate the public performance right.

We can brief all of those cases for you and we can do that next week. I bet you Mr. Fabrizio can do it, too, so we can get going. Then there won't be any surprises. To the extent you have the brief and you think about it and have more questions, you can ask us for more briefing. In the meantime, there is no slight of hand here. They will know what our theory is. They do. They anticipated it. It has been on their web site for a while what their theory is. They know what we are going to say.

What is interesting, I have to come back to it, every time you heard from Mr. Englander on the merits, he kept talking about copies. Copies goes to the reproduction right. We are interested in the preliminary injunction as a violation of the public performance right, and Cablevision, at Page 134, says they're not the same for any number of purposes, most importantly who's doing the act.

This is a little little like the Wizard of Oz, where Toto pulls back the curtain and there is a wizard pulling the levers and buttons and switches, and the Great Oz being projected up on the screen says pay no attention to the man behind the curtain who is really doing the projection.

AEREO is doing the same thing. Pay no attention to the fact we set up an entire system to grab broadcast signals over the air. They use a fiction of a mini-antenna and say that you know what, we fit within Cablevision. They process our copyrighted programming and they stream it across the internet, and Mr. Englander is wrong when he says consumers can do it now. They can't do it now. If they could do it now, stream signals across the internet, you wouldn't need an aerial. They can't do it now.

When he says they can do it now, he is talking about time-shifting. We are not litigating time-shifting. The Supreme Court has spoken. The public performance right, every time it has been litigated in this courthouse and elsewhere, whatever the defense, the cases were the same, they take the TV signal, copyrighted programming, stream it to subscribers or users on the internet. Every single case says that is a violation of the public performance right. Cablevision does not speak to the contrary. We are ready to brief that for you next week.

MR. ENGLANDER: First of all, we did suggest four months to have briefing complete and be ready to go.

THE COURT: Four months to the hearing?

MR. ENGLANDER: Yes, four months to be ready to decide it on the merits. We really are, and I don't think -- as I listened to Mr. Keller, he doesn't have specifics as to how we

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are going to get from six weeks of discovery to a properly briefed hearing before you in eight weeks. I don't see it. Ι think we really are, as you pointed out, sort of debating the difference between two and four months.

The second point, the public performance right, Cablevision directly addresses the public performance right and directly holds in that case there was no public performance because the individual was making their own unique copy, using Cablevision's system and playing back their own unique copy to themselves. That is exactly what AEREO's system allows, and it is true that right now a consumer with the appropriate electronics can do exactly that and they can do it through an internet system to an international monitor.

THE COURT: Do you have -- the response is not the right word -- anything you want to say about if the matters are consolidated and how that interfaces with the scheduling in any way in light of what you've heard, Mr. Fabrizio?

MR. FABRIZIO: Yes.

MR. ENGLANDER: Here is the only thing that their case may add, and it is unclear to me to what degree they're going to pursue it, is an indirect infringement case. Our position, as I believe -- I can tell your Honor has done some looking at this -- our position is that that case is foreclosed by Sony, that Sony holds that an individual has the right, that the consumer is engaged in a fair use when they make a copy of an

over-the-air broadcast for themselves and they play it back to themselves.

That is not a public performance because it is just coming to them. Cablevision establishes that unequivocally. Therefore, we can move for summary judgment on the indirect infringement case as well and we can put that before you at the same time, and we believe it can be resolved on summary judgment. That is the difference that this case may add.

MR. FABRIZIO: I can save counsel some time?
THE COURT: Say that again?

MR. FABRIZIO: I can save counsel some time.

We do not have a claim for the virtual DVR copying that they allowed. The reproduction claim in our complaint is because we do not know the internal workings of how they engage in the public performances and what copies and what is the nature of copies that were made in aid of the public performances.

THE COURT: You would need additional discovery beyond the PI discovery for --

MR. FABRIZIO: No, your Honor. It is part and parcel of the same discovery. I believe what everybody needs is to know how a signal gets into their system, how it works its way through their system, and how it leaves their system, and that's the discovery that will tell us that. It is no additional discovery. We may very well not move on that. It

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depends entirely on things we do not know now about how they do what they do in their public performing of these works.

To be as clear as can be, we have not moved, we have not filed a complaint raising claims against the virtual DVR portion of their service.

MR. KELLER: Your Honor, we keep going back between merits and scheduling. Scheduling is much more important because it is unfair for you to have to listen to lawyers who have been thinking about this for a few weeks at least, and in the case of AEREO much longer, baffle you with all sorts of citations.

THE COURT: You're worried about me?

MR. KELLER: I am not worried. It is unfair.

THE COURT: I am looking forward to the briefing.

MR. KELLER: We should give you a better record.

THE COURT: I am not going to decide --

MR. KELLER: We want the expedited discovery so we can do that. That is the way the case should be teed-up for you so you have everything you need and not just lawyers' argument, which is all you'll get, but we'll give it to you next week.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander, you might want to make another point.

The only thing, that was a very MR. ENGLANDER: helpful clarification. It sounds like we are not engaged about a debate what Sony did or didn't cover.

I agree with Mr. Fabrizio, based on what he is talking about, the discovery can be done as the discovery Mr. Keller would need to do and motions for summary judgment from our perspective can be filed against those claims.

So that is is very helpful. We are now just debating, it sounds like we are debating between 8 to 10 to 12 weeks and 4 months and what is appropriate to get the appropriate record and the appropriate briefing before you to resolve if they're going to file for preliminary injunction and when we see it, we can do that and do motion for summary judgment from our side.

MR. KELLER: If you said six weeks for expedited discovery or less, we would have our moving brief in addition to whatever we give you next week, I stand by that offer the day discovery closes. That is a full two weeks.

THE COURT: Plus, plus some preliminary briefing potentially on --

MR. KELLER: I am ready to brief something for you next week.

THE COURT: That would make, and my thinking is in part starting to get me into the law, but also to just I think of it as just a clear target for the PI for the other side, that they don't have to -- they can quickly know what it is as you have represented.

MR. KELLER: We can lay it all out for them next week so they have a roadmap of our moving case. The only thing that

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will follow will be the facts, the proverbial meat on the bones, and then the day the discovery closes is the day we can submit our pre-hearing brief with the facts that elaborate on our legal theory.

If we got done in five weeks of discovery, you would have five weeks and then you would have two to three weeks, our brief comes in the day discovery closes, their brief comes in the next week, our reply brief comes in a few days after that and that's how we do. I don't think it is that hard, from six weeks to eight weeks or five weeks to eight weeks. It is done all the time.

This really, the degree to which we are getting pushed back on this I think is proof in the pudding. They want to put this off, but they can't any longer. They're trying to have it all ways. We didn't move fast enough, but now that we have moved, now it is too fast.

THE COURT: What I hear is they want to put it off a little bit in order to get everything resolved at once.

MR. KELLER: There is nothing extra. That is why I come back to Rule 56. They can move for summary judgment any time. We are not going to stop you.

THE COURT: Let me ask, we touched on it, but what would your view be to under 65 (a)(2) to consolidate the PI hearing with the trial on merits? Could we do that?

MR. KELLER: I don't know what our client's position

is on that because I haven't raised it with him. You have the power to do it, on notice to the parties. I don't know what that does to the case, but I have to tell you it does serve

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similar purposes as their plan. The one thing I can tell you my clients would say is unacceptable to them, if they were

asking what their preference is, they wouldn't want that to add time to the schedule. In other words --

THE COURT: Would they if it were a day, two days?

MR. KELLER: I settle cases on --

THE COURT: You're close?

MR. KELLER: One day is not going to make --

THE COURT: I am curious if there is way to get to something like a three-month schedule, not to be overly simplistic, but you want to, once they want four months, could we get to three months and do everything?

I should take a peek at my calendar to know if it is even in the ballpark.

MR. KELLER: The whole point of coming down today, your Honor, was to take your calendar into account. You should do that.

THE COURT: That's why we're here, but I am saying I should look. I literally have my calendar here so I want to look because we might be arguing, we will know exactly what we're arguing about. But, Mr. Englander, did --

MR. ENGLANDER: One other issue I want to raise, does

Mr. Keller anticipate expert affidavits with respect to his preliminary injunction motion?

MR. KELLER: Yes.

MR. ENGLANDER: So part of why we thought four months was the appropriate time is because we anticipated that experts would be involved, that the experts wouldn't be able to do anything until the discovery of our system was done and that there would be deposition discovery of those experts.

Again I'm working off my experience with the Cablevision case where there were limited experts, it was done very cooperatively and efficiently, and in the end there was really no disputed fact.

If you read the case of the District Court or the Second Circuit, although there was actual live testimony about how the systems worked, there were no disputed facts. It was useful, I think, to both courts to have that process play out.

THE COURT: But it is right that in Cablevision there was an agreement not to proceed until --

MR. ENGLANDER: That's correct, your Honor. My point is this -- and again we do not want to delay this -- if it is believed we can do this on a shorter time-frame, we certainly will endeavor to do that.

If Mr. Keller is going to drop an expert affidavit for the first time on us a week before a scheduled preliminary injunction hearing or two weeks before it, then we've

compressed our time quite a bit.

THE COURT: Mr. Keller, when you say four to six weeks, that is fact discovery and that is distinct from expert discovery?

MR. KELLER: No, your Honor. We'll do it all.

MR. ENGLANDER: That is fine.

MR. FABRIZIO: Your Honor, just one quick point.

Defendants seem to be under the impression they have an absolute right to present a dispositive summary judgment motion at the same time we present a preliminary injunction.

Obviously, preliminary injunctions are preliminary in nature, they are a different standard. They're designed to stop irreparable harm.

They argue it is a totally different system. What this Court has already decided, has already ruled on a full factual record that the exact same consumer service causes us irreparable harm. There is no question about that.

THE COURT: What is that?

MR. FABRIZIO: IVI case. IVI had one big antenna. Beyond that, as far as we can tell, it is the same thing.

So whether it is one big antenna or, as they like to say, tons of teeny, tiny, little antennas, we think the legal issue is identical. The reality is the irreparable harm we face, our clients face from a retransmission television service over the internet is identical, and the court has ruled, made

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factual findings that we are suffering irreparable harm.

There is just no right on the part of the defendant to presuppose that a schedule has to work backwards from their preferred summary judgment on a final disposition of the case. The reality is, we will have the preliminary injunction and one side or the other is very likely to immediately appeal that preliminary injunction, and then you will get to final dispositive closure on a preliminary injunction basis. Whether the case goes on after that, your Honor, most experience is cases at that point would end.

We shouldn't be held to an expedited final disposition that delays our preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunctions are heard on two, three, four weeks of discovery all the time. That is really all we are asking for.

THE COURT: Two, three, four, five, six?

MR. FABRIZIO: Two, four, six, your Honor. The point is taken.

THE COURT: I suppose another option would be to just do a very compressed PI schedule.

MR. HOSP: If I may, two quick points.

One is we seem to be hearing the completely separate argument from both sides which is on the one hand, they couldn't have filed a preliminary injunction until now because they didn't know what was behind the curtain.

On the other hand, they know exactly what the system

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is and they know that somehow someone, this Court has ruled against it previously.

THE COURT: I am not, as I sit here, moved by the fact they didn't file sooner. As I've said, you can make those arguments in front of me is a question of irreparable harm.

MR. HOSP: Fair enough.

THE COURT: They can bring a preliminary injunction motion.

MR. HOSP: Fair enough. We are not disputing at all their right to bring a preliminary injunction hearing, not in the least. We think that delay should be accounted for in the scheduling of that preliminary injunction hearing.

Ultimately we are really are talking about scheduling, and that is really the --

THE COURT: We'll have a scheduling hearing.

MR. FABRIZIO: We are not done yet.

THE COURT: We are getting there.

MR. KELLER: What is this record?

THE COURT: An hour and a half.

MR. HOSP: What we are hoping for is to make sure the discovery needs to be conducted, the discovery plaintiffs intend to take of our client and the discovery we need to take of plaintiffs can all happen in a way that, sure, absolutely. If the parties want to file summary judgment briefs when that is over, that is fine. If they want to file preliminary

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injunction briefs when that is over, that is fine as well.

What we don't want to have happen is basically have a schedule that goes forward with a limited amount of discovery for preliminary injunction and then the process somehow grinds to a halt, we do the preliminary injunction and we don't get discovery if we need it to resolve this on the merits because that is --

THE COURT: I would set the schedule for discovery following PI. Based on representations, I can set it and maybe even without I can set a very tight schedule.

MR. HOSP: What we are asking for again is the notion that these two processes be rolled into each other in a reasonable way, that is our goal.

MR. FABRIZIO: Our point is they simply have no right to insist that they be rolled together.

THE COURT: That is true. I thought for a moment we might be verging on some agreement, but now I am less certain. Let me pause talking for a moment and look at my calendar.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Mr. Keller, you had said your desire would be no later than May -- what was it?

MR. KELLER: If possible, your Honor, the week of May 14th.

THE COURT: Am I seeing this right, Sayra, that I have a trial starting on the 15th? I have a trial the week of the

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15th, the week of the 14th and the 21st?

(Off-the-record discussion)

THE COURT: It turns out I have two trials in May. I have a three day Bench trial starting on May 15th, so that week is going to be out. That will go to trial.

The following week I have a week-long jury trial starting on the 21st. So we need to either have to move closer in time or further in time. Given your harm, is moving closer in time a possibility?

MR. KELLER: I think it is a possibility. Here is my suggestion: In the spirit of cooperation that has characterized the entire proceeding, I think Mr. Hosp and Mr. Englander and Mr. Fabrizio and I ought to get together and see what around that time-frame is doable and pick a date that is either before the two weeks that you have, two weeks you have blocked out or the week thereafter because obviously if those two weeks are blacked out, they're blacked out.

I have to say even I, as urgent as this is and irreparable as the harm may be, can't say one week on the side of two weeks or week after makes that much difference as long as everybody understands we are not waiving any irreparable harm arguments in an effort to come up with a schedule that works for everybody.

THE COURT: Here is where I am. I would like it if we can do this all at once, but there is not agreement on that.

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In that case, I think you're entitled to a preliminary injunction and to make your arguments and I can accommodate a proceeding, a hearing, I can accommodate it the week of April I can accommodate it the week of May 7th. I appreciate your wanting to work it out, but I think --

MR. KELLER: In the spirit of cooperation, why don't we pick the week after, the week of the 28th which then gives everybody another two weeks, gives you more time because if you have trials in those two weeks, you are going to need time to read our submissions. I think that is the fairest thing of all. If we have it the week of the 28th is the week you are available again, right, your Honor?

THE COURT: I am available the week of the 28th, but the 28th itself the courthouse is apparently closed.

MR. KELLER: Memorial Day, the 28th.

THE COURT: I wouldn't mind, but you won't be able to aet --

MR. KELLER: I wouldn't mind. A hearing that week is the way to go then. That way we can make sure that the briefs come in far enough in advance of your two trials so that you have time with the record that will be created.

MR. FABRIZIO: As a current quest in this courtroom, I am hesitant to mention a personal scheduling matter. would be perfect as long as it -- no, that would be perfect as long as it doesn't slip. For over a year I have been planning

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with my wife to go to the artic, and we leave on June 7th.

THE COURT: If it slipped beyond that week, we would be in Mr. Englander's schedule.

MR. FABRIZIO: Hopefully they won't take that as an invitation to delay things a little more.

MR. KELLER: Your Honor, that is my -- the week of the 28th, if we get it done that week, accommodates that concern. That is what we would request that you order expedited discovery between now and then, and the parties can actually, can with this threshold issue resolved, work out a lot of the rest.

I will represent now, although I don't know what our position is going to be on summary judgment, I am not looking to do things twice or to make the argument that discovery is incomplete. If it is incomplete or if they think they need something from us that they haven't gotten for their summary judgment motion, I'll represent to the court they can continue on an expedited discovery basis if that makes sense to them thereafter. You can order it anyway, as you said earlier. This isn't an effort to --

THE COURT: Do you think there is some possibility, that once you've got, everybody has the date in mind and discovery is full steam ahead, that you wouldn't be opposed to consolidating to trial on the merits?

MR. KELLER: Your Honor, that would be the first

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question I ask the clients when I get back, obviously. You have asked now twice. Let me find out what their position is on that.

THE COURT: If it helps, I can ask a third time, you can tell your client.

MR. KELLER: It will be in the transcript. We will get it straight.

We will certainly take that under advisement and I can give your their position. On Rule 65 you can do it on notice, you can impose your desire that way so the parties know they have to complete their best possible record in the time allotted so it is not so much a do they want it if you think it makes sense. Everyone will have a clearer picture of whether it makes sense once we get going on discovery.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander?

MR. ENGLANDER: Your Honor, that is fine. We are fine with the schedule. There are a couple of housekeeping issues associated.

Mr. Keller has represented the reason we are fine with the schedule, Mr. Keller represented he is going to provide us a brief that indicates, lays out those parts of his case that he can lay out.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ENGLANDER: Frankly, based on what we are hearing now, we are going to endeavor to file a motion for summary

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judgment far enough in advance to have that brief for you on that same schedule. We can sit down and try to figure out a briefing schedule, and I think there is a fair chance we'll be able to do it. Is that what you want to prefer or are we going to try to hash that out while we are here?

THE COURT: We can hash out some of it and you can -for my purposes, I would like a set of preliminary briefs on as
much pre-fact or in the world of facts as you have it now that
can be done. Maybe that will -- and not only will help me, but
then the target is clear. So let's at least set a schedule for
that.

MR. KELLER: Next week?

THE COURT: My only hesitation is I don't yet know whether the cases are consolidated. I think I should be able to -- I am hopeful I'll hear from Judge Marrero today or tomorrow and see where he is. A week from today would be great.

MR. KELLER: Okay. My question is: Does it assist the court if those briefs, the initial briefs, come in, even though it is a little unusual, not in the form of a moving brief, but a Bench memo for the court simultaneously submitted, and simultaneously each side responds to the other brief because that will save some time.

THE COURT: No.

MR. KELLER: I am just asking.

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	THE	COURT:	Part	of	the	work	being	done	here	is	just
setting	the '	target of	you	r Pi	I mot	cion.					
	MR.	KELLER:	Okav	/ .							

THE COURT: I don't think they should be asked to simultaneously brief.

MR. KELLER: We'll submit a brief a week from today. Then what would be the rest of the schedule thereafter?

THE COURT: Do you want to work it out or do you want me to sort it out?

MR. KELLER: A week from today is what you ruled on our brief. Tell us where you are.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander, Mr. Keller has volunteered a week from today for his. What would you like?

MR. ENGLANDER: This is not an opposition brief, but more in the nature of responsive to his brief what our position is?

THE COURT: Well, yes, call it what you like. It will be responsive to his brief. You'll have the opportunity, you'll both obviously have opportunity to do your briefing in advance of the hearing following discovery.

MR. ENGLANDER: We anticipate also filing a motion for summary judgment. Giving him enough time to respond will probably be more of a -- let me confer with Mr. Hosp to make sure I am not committing to something.

THE COURT: While you're doing that, while you're

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doing that, we'll pick our date. Why don't I reserve for the	
hearing, I've got other matters on Fridays, so I am looking at	
for the hearing itself May 29th, 30th and 31st.	
MR. ENGLANDER: If you set it either Wednesday or	
Thursday, it seems to me that will give us an opportunity to	
come back from the weekend.	
THE COURT: It has to be done in two days.	
MR. KELLER: I think that can be done in two days,	
your Honor.	
THE COURT: We'll take the 30th and 31st.	
MR. ENGLANDER: That sounds right. If I get the dates	
right, you're saying you will have your brief in somewhere	
around the 21st or thereabouts, right?	
How about if we file a responsive brief to Mr.	
Keller's brief mid-April and also file any motion for summary	
judgment we are going to file at that time?	
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, again they can move at any	
time, but I want to be clear what I said earlier.	
THE COURT: Right.	
MR. KELLER: If they move for summary judgment before	
there has been any discovery, what do you think our opposition	
is going to be based on?	
We can't say whether there is any disputed facts until	

an evidentiary discovery record has been created. I know that

they like the concept of summary judgment, but I want to be

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clear, if they do it at the very outset of the expedited 1 2 discovery period --3 THE COURT: You said --4 MR. ENGLANDER: Their opposition wouldn't need to be 5 due until mid-May, at which point all fact discovery should be 6 in and they should have the opportunity to respond on a full 7 factual record. 8 MR. FABRIZIO: Maybe I missed something. What are you 9 proposing for mid-April, the response to what we file next 10 week? 11 THE COURT: He suggested consolidating for his 12 purposes. 13 MR. ENGLANDER: I think we'll file them separately if 14 it is okay? 15 THE COURT: Well, let's keep them distinct. Let's set a time-frame for the preliminary sets of briefs. If you don't 16 17 want to file it, you don't have to file it. It is up to you. 18 I think it is right you say you can bring your summary judgment motion whenever you like, but knowing that we need to 19 20 be looking at towards the close of discovery in order for Mr. 21 Keller to be able to respond, and I trust that he will if we 22 are done with that, we can move forward and do this all at 23 If we can't, we can't, but we are going to try to do once.

learned in the course of discovery.

It is my hope if it is feasible given what you have all

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You're free to bring your motion whenever you like. If you would like to respond as a preliminary matter, tell me when you would like to.

MR. ENGLANDER: I would say mid-April would be time for a responsive brief.

THE COURT: You have a concern with that?

MR. KELLER: I am just trying to --

MR. FABRIZIO: -- I don't have a concern with that, but I would make a counter-suggestion.

THE COURT: Hang on a second. We have a court reporter and two people talking.

MR. FABRIZIO: Sorry. I have a counter-consideration. I have no problem with their filing their response in mid-April. My suggestion would be we file our brief not a week from today, but a week from Friday, so it is the end of next week.

THE COURT: You are not in front of me yet. I can't tell you when to file a brief.

MR. KELLER: I have to tell you something. I do have a problem with a mid-April response to what we are filing only because we're now being asked to put in a brief in a week, which I represented we would do, but then as I count the calendar weeks, that gives them one, two, three weeks at a minimum to put in something on their own. That seems a little --

THE COURT: Isn't it just to their disadvantage to have your side of the matter sitting in front of me?

MR. KELLER: That depends on things that I don't know about as to how Chambers works. If you are going to read it right away and study it intently every day, perhaps. I am thinking it does give them an inordinate advantage in terms of time because they will be taking discovery as we are going through this process — look, I think it is equitable.

I understood the desire of the court to have preliminary briefing from people who obviously know the case law, so you can get the law lay of the land, as the lawyers see it. We'll put in our brief next week on any day you order. We are happy to do it a week from today and we will.

They should not have three more weeks to respond.

That doesn't seem quite fair to me. It should be a shorter period and they shouldn't be able to work in any of the facts that might be adduced in the course of discovery that will be ongoing.

THE COURT: I didn't understand that latter part, what Mr. Englander was asking.

MR. KELLER: I don't think -- I am expressing concerns what I perceive to be a relative unfairness. That said, my position is stated. So any way you like it!

MR. HOSP: At the risk of seeming agreeable --

THE COURT: By all means!

MR. HOSP: -- I think, Mr. Keller, with the parameters that your Honor has laid out in terms of Mr. Keller's initial brief and the ultimate date for the hearing, I think if we all sit down, we can actually hammer out this schedule, but it probably makes more sense to do that with everybody's calendars out and actually looking and having the opportunity to talk through this specifically.

THE COURT: That is fine with me. My view on this point, Mr. Keller, is that as the movant, you're seeking the PI in the time-frame that you are, I think for my purposes what I want is an opening brief on the law that narrows the issues. It seems to me it is to their disadvantage to take longer than they need to respond to that, but they don't have to respond to it at the end of the day.

I agree what it can't, what it can't do is sort of incorporate factual information because that just means that you're going to come and say we need an opportunity to respond to that, and then I'll have eight briefs before we get to the actual briefing.

MR. KELLER: Understood.

MR. ENGLANDER: Your Honor, with one issue that is significant. I understood that Mr. Keller in his initial brief would also lay out what their irreparable harm case is so that we have an adequate opportunity to respond to that before the close of discovery and the hearing. That was part of the

reason why the expedited schedule made sense. I think that will have some facts baked into it. They're all within the control of plaintiff.

MR. KELLER: Your Honor, let me make it easy. Our irreparable harm is exactly the irreparable harm that the broadcasters suffered in the IVI case and --

THE COURT: This initial briefing can include your --

MR. KELLER: There are no secrets. The irreparable harm will be exactly as the same type of harm that Judge Buchwald found to be irreparable in the IVI and that led her to issue a temporary restraining order in the Film On case.

THE COURT: You will want to make that argument to me and not ask me to reference --

MR. KELLER: There will be specific facts that we will talk about as we put on our preliminary injunction evidence on the schedule that you've already just ordered, but for the purposes of the preliminary brief I am telling them now what it is. It is not a secret. They know it already.

 $\label{eq:weak_entropy} \text{We are going to have $--$ I see a fight looming, and I} \\ \text{will try to resolve it.}$

THE COURT: I would rather resolve it now.

MR. KELLER: We are not going to give them all of our various retransmission agreements because they weren't ordered to be given given up in the IVI case. They are extremely confidential and it is the fact of the agreement and not

specific details that creates the irreparable harm.

Whether we got paid 10 cents or \$10,000 isn't the issue. The loss of control over the distribution of our copyrighted programming is the irreparable harm that we will be relying on. Just as Judge Buchwald ruled, we don't need to give them the various agreements that we have with cable operators and multisystem operators and satellite operators.

Those agreements, they exist. We can tell them that they exist. We can identify their existence, so we can swear to their existence on a stack of Bibles. We know they exist. You can take judicial notice our copyrighted programming is retransmitted across the United States in a variety of ways by people who either qualify for compulsory licenses or take the time to negotiate their own licenses. They're doing neither.

That is irreparable harm. The loss of control over copyrighted content is well recognized as irreparable harm and we will put on the facts that we will lose control and the reasons why, but we will not willingly, and if we have to brief this, too, we will, although I would like to avoid it because it is not the first time the issue has been litigated. We will put in a lot of details why that is not something they get to have in discovery. The irreparable harm case is absolutely clear. It is ruled on. It is the same case as IVI.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander, am I correct that to assume you intend to argue you are entitled to the retransmission

agreements?

MR. ENGLANDER: Yes, but we are not prepared to argue that in the brief. They're the moving plaintiff claiming irreparable harm. This will be relevant discovery, it seems to me. We would like the opportunity to brief it. We know it will be an issue, so we will try to get it resolved as quickly as we can.

MR. FABRIZIO: In answer to your question, I think the brief that we will file, assuming both two briefs, I don't think we intend to submit evidence, actually affidavits for irreparable harm, but I see no reason why we would not identify the categories of harm and the legal underpinning or our irreparable harm case.

MR. KELLER: I absolutely agree. That is what I meant to say. If I didn't make it clear, I apologize.

MR. HOSP: As you indicated before, there is an indirect infringement claim here. I want to be clear there is overlap between the notion of irreparable harm with respect to injunctive relief and preliminary injunction and the fourth factor of the fair use test to the extent that there is a claim for indirect infringement with respect to potential value of the programming.

Is the same argument going to be limited to the extent that we get into a fair use defense?

MR. FABRIZIO: Honestly, I don't know what you just

meant.

THE COURT: I didn't understand the point. I don't think I need to. Here is what we are going to do. I set the hearing date. I want an initial set of briefing. I am going to set dates, so by the 21st for the movant and -- I despise this calendar -- April 4th in response.

I'd like a joint letter on the remaining -- actually, let's just do it. We're talking closing discovery for the PI -- well, I propose April 17th, which is five weeks. Actually, hang on. We moved it back. The close of discovery by April 24th.

MR. HOSP: Is that inclusive of expert discovery?

THE COURT: It is. Mr. Keller, you intend to submit briefing on that date, you said?

MR. KELLER: Sure, yes, if you would like, in addition to the brief that we are already going to give you, additional briefing in advance of the preliminary injunction hearing, we will do that. It is going to be somewhat, it is going to be a little duplicative because the legal arguments wouldn't have changed very much, but it will certainly have the benefit of specific factual points we intend to produce at the hearing.

THE COURT: I would like from each side briefing in advance of the hearing once we hit the close of discovery.

MR. FABRIZIO: Your Honor, would it be possible for the parties to work out the schedule for that briefing?

THE COURT: I don't know.

MR. FABRIZIO: I believe it would be. I believe

Mr. Hosp was making the same suggestion. That way we can -
THE COURT: I am comfortable with that. I am

comfortable with that. So you have got the hearing date now, you have the close of discovery including expert discovery, you have got dates on initial briefing prediscovery. I am happy for you to work out otherwise between yourselves and submit a joint letter to me with briefing in advance of the hearing itself.

MR. FABRIZIO: I think we need just one more thing from your Honor. How far in advance of the hearing date would you like to see the last brief filed?

THE COURT: Well, I hope for one of my other trials settling in May. I need to have it, I would like to have it by the 14th. That is giving me two weeks.

MR. FABRIZIO: So it shall be!

THE COURT: Anyone concerned about that?

MR. ENGLANDER: It seems a little tight if we are contemplating replies. The first brief is April 24th?

THE COURT: We can do it without replies. I guess it depends in part whether you're moving for summary judgment.

MR. ENGLANDER: We can come very close to that date.

THE COURT: Okay. With that, why don't you work out the specific --

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MR. KELLER: We'll see if we can work it out and report back. I have one more question.

THE COURT: Let me just set, so we have got -- why don't you all submit a joint letter to me by this Friday, and then in response to that I'll -- assuming everything is agreed upon and I agree to it -- I'll put out an order memorializing the schedule.

MR. FABRIZIO: Hopefully we will be officially yours before then. If not, you will be able to assume we agree with whatever Mr. Keller said sight unseen, how about that?

MR. KELLER: I wish life were like that.

Your Honor, did you, after hearing all of this, come closer to a decision whether you would like direct by declaration and cross only for --

THE COURT: I would like live direct.

MR. KELLER: Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander, you were standing?

MR. ENGLANDER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So you'll submit to me by Friday a certifiable proposal that works within the boundaries I have set. I imagine I'll be hear from you in-between at least on one discovery dispute unless you can work it out. do strongly encourage if there are others that you try to work them out, but call us if you need us.

MR. ENGLANDER: Sorry, but I need a little

clarification because I am a little behind.

As far as the hearing goes, I am coming to understand anyone who submits an affidavit should be available to give live direct, is that it?

THE COURT: My rules had anticipated for Bench trials and generally PIs that I was going to do affidavits for direct testimony and just cross-examination. I am actually going to change those rules, so I will effectuate that change now and, in any event, I would want it hear.

MR. ENGLANDER: If there is no limit, then --

THE COURT: We'll meet and do a final, a conference in advance of the hearing to make sure that we have an agreed upon basic schedule, and I know from looking at -- if you're going to file for summary judgment, you submit whatever affidavits.

MR. ENGLANDER: All I am trying to get a handle on is the scope of this preliminary injunction hearing in terms of who is actually going to testify as opposed to information that is supplied by affidavit.

Again I think you're right, we can probably talk about this. My sense is probably there are some witnesses that the parties will want to put in front of you. There may be other stuff that an affidavit is enough.

THE COURT: Of course, of course. Only put live witnesses in front of me that I am going to need. You can put in affidavits of folks who will be live witnesses, I'll read it

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I agree, I hope you'll come to agreement on a basic all. schedule for the hearing and scope of it. It is two days, everyone. You look perplexed, Mr. Keller.

MR. KELLER: I was thinking, your Honor -- and I am sorry that it showed -- would it not ordinarily be the case in duplicate --

THE COURT: He may file for summary judgment.

MR. KELLER: That is his choice. The point is with your ruling that you want live witnesses, I am thinking there won't be too many people that we will have affidavits from as part of our preliminary injunction case, and I was just thinking through how that fit with what was being said.

My view of it is, and then I was thinking even more, and that is what you saw, about whether it makes sense in this case to have some sort of schedule beyond two days, whether there should be X hours put aside or something like that. is something we'll talk about.

THE COURT: Why don't you talk about it, try to sort it out, and if you can't, then we can do a phone conference and I'll set the ground rules.

MR. KELLER: Understood.

THE COURT: You look perplexed!

MR. ENGLANDER: I am because now I am thinking sort of one way to do this, obviously, is the affidavits and the full basis for their motion for preliminary injunction are before

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you before t	he	hearing	tal	kes p	lace	e. We	have	e had a	a ful	ll
opportunity	to	respond	to	what	we	think	the	facts	are	before
the hearing	tak	kes place	€.							

Live witnesses come on because you may have technology that needs to be explained. If we do it the other way and we don't have all the evidence in until at the hearing, then we are going to have post-hearing briefing. I was just sort of going through that in my head. Again that is your Honor's --

THE COURT: Why don't you all see what you want to propose to wrap this all up, and I'll take a look and let you know if I agree or disagree. If you can't agree, I'll tell you what the grounds rules are.

MR. KELLER: That makes sense. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything further before -- you have now set the record. This is my longest scheduling conference to date. I haven't been at this very long.

MR. FABRIZIO: You scheduled a preliminary injunction and summary judgment motion?

THE COURT: Potentially.

MR. FABRIZIO: Maybe.

MR. KELLER: Thank you for seeing us on such short notice.

> THE COURT: Is there anything else, Mr. Keller?

MR. KELLER: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Englander and Hosp?

C3DJABCM Motions MR. HOSP: Thank your Honor. MR. ENGLANDER: No. MR. FABRIZIO: Thank your Honor. THE COURT: Very well. I'll be hearing from you soon. (Court adjourned)